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Intelligence can be understood as an agent’s ability to predict its environment’s dynamic by a level of 
precision which allows it to effectively foresee opportunities and threats. Under the assumption that such 
intelligence relies on a knowledge space any effective reasoning would benefit from a maximum portion 
of useful and a minimum portion of misleading knowledge fragments. It begs the question of how the 
quality of such knowledge space can be kept high as the amount of knowledge keeps growing. This 
article proposes a mathematical model to describe general principles of how quality of a growing 
knowledge space evolves depending on error rate, error propagation and countermeasures. There is 
also shown to which extend the quality of a knowledge space collapses as removal of low quality 
knowledge fragments occurs too slowly for a given knowledge space’s growth rate. 
A probabilistic dynamic model of knowledge spaces quality 
evolution 
In the age of modern epistemology intelligence is not an indisputable term as the concept of 
reality is neither. The term intelligence as used in following can accept a Glasersfeld’s 
epistemological view of constructivism [1] as far as two conditions are accepted:  
(I) An agent’s intelligence enables it to derive regularities from experience in order to 
guide it to advantageous actions. 
(II) There is an underlying reality which is consistent with itself, i.e. different 
perspectives on the same subject-matter do not result contradictorily [2]. 
This article further assumes an agent’s intelligence is based on some knowledge space. A 
knowledge space is composed by knowledge fragments acquired during the agent’s step by 
step learning. The knowledge space is a crucial part of the world model which the agent is 
establishing to gain orientation in its dynamic environment. Whether the knowledge space is 
understood, naively, as a representation of reality or whether it just composes the agent’s 
subjective reality is not important in the context of this article as long as the basic 
assumptions (I) and (II) mentioned above are accepted. 
In following, an atomic fragment of this knowledge space will be named concept. Inspired by 
constructivism, each of such concepts has been established by concepts already existing 
within an agent’s knowledge space enriched by an agent’s sensory information. New concepts 
are either assumed to be created by deductive [4][5][6] or by inductive [7][8] inference. 
When an agent tries to predict its environment it usually selects a subset from its whole 
knowledge space due to some method. Using this knowledge subset, it deduces predictions 
about the environment.  
However, the prediction quality depends on the quality of concepts used. The concepts can 
never be of perfect quality because mapping the world into a limited model means simplifying 
and losing information. A resulting prediction will probably be incorrect if relevant 
information has, for some reason, been lost, i.e. the prediction will conflict with the 
subsequently perceived result of the corresponding world behaviour. 
Within our probabilistic model, the quality of each concept can be defined as an abstract 
prediction success probability p (p  0 p 1), measuring how often a single concept 
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contributes to a correct prediction result relative to the frequency of its invocation within any 
context. Within a concept space , the concepts with p Plim (Plim  0 Plim 1) will, by 
definition, be called parasitic and concepts with p Plim will be called accurate, whilst Plim can 
be chosen arbitrarily.  
Low quality concepts may be established for particular reasons such as overgeneralization 
[9] in inductive cognitive processes or processing failure or incomplete processing [10] during 
deductive cognitive processes. Such cognition failures can lead to the miscreation of a new 
concept. It is assumed that each new concept is formed as parasitic in consequence of 
erroneous logic or bad induction with a probability Perr (Perr  0  Perr 1). 
Referring to the assumption, that new concepts usually are founded in existing ones, there 
can be identified still another possibility of a concept becoming parasitic: if at least one of its 
base concepts is parasitic (figure 1). A concept is defined as a base concept if it is necessary 
for the derivation of a child-concept by cognitive deduction [5].  
As such, using the child-concept also means including the quality of all of its base concepts, 
giving a prediction success probability pchild min(pbase(1), ... , pbase(n)) where pbase is the 
prediction success probability of the respective base concept and n the number of all base 
concepts contributing to the child concept. In other words, the quality of a child-concept 
cannot be better than the worst quality of any of its base concepts. This way, quality problems 
are propagating throughout the concept space by including base concepts of low quality. 
Hierarchically structured pattern classifiers which help an intelligent agent to determine the 
semantic meaning of objects it is dealing with [3] are one typical example for deeply tree 
structured concept hierarchies including numerous base concepts for most of the concepts 
within those classifiers. 
Assuming firstly a prediction success quality pn of any base concept for a specific child 
concept as statistically independent from pm of any other base concept and secondly that base 
concepts appear to be randomly chosen over , the resulting probability of forming a parasitic 
child-concept by including a parasitic base concept is  
(1) 
Bp
ip
c
c
p )1(1   
where c (c ) is the total number of concepts in , cp (cp ) is the number of parasitic 
concepts in and B (B ) is the number of base concepts for each child concept. Since 
further analysis considers a non-discrete growth process, the first two parameters are not 
defined as integers.  
Assuming further that either the corresponding influence of pip or Perr is sufficient to cause a 
new concept to become parasitic, the total probability of a concept becoming parasitic results 
in 
(2) 
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Now the process of a growing concept space can be described as 
(3) trtLpc cleanuppp   
(4) trtLc cleanup   
  
 3 
where cp and c ( cp, c  0 cp, c 1) are the change rates of the respective 
concept counters for each time step t. L describes the total number of new concepts 
generated each time step, and for simplicity, is assumed to be 1. This means, that each time 
step one new concept is generated.  
The factor rcleanup (rcleanup ) describes a new aspect: Each time step there is not only created 
a potion of parasitic concepts determined by pp, but it is also assumed that by some procedure 
each time step a portion of parasitic concepts is removed from  in order to cleanse the 
concept space of concepts with low prediction quality.  
For now, with L=1 there can be derived the differential equation from (3), (4) and (2) as 
(5) 
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which here will be named equation of parasitic contamination. It describes the evolution of 
the amount of parasitic concepts relative to the evolution of the total amount of concepts 
within an intelligent agent. Its solution provides us with an understanding of how 
contamination evolves when c increases. 
However, before solving the equation, rcleanup must be examined more closely. Two generic 
methods of identifying parasitic concepts will be introduced. Generally, it is assumed, that 
finding parasitic concepts is a non-trivial process within the intelligent agent. Otherwise the 
agent could have avoided establishing such concepts at creation time. Both clean-up 
approaches are based on statistical methods.  
The first method proposes a clean-up by experience. This means that concepts are somehow 
sampled over time for their quality and if they are found to have insufficient quality, they will 
be removed from . One way would be to provide each concept with a cumulative quality 
rate, which is increased each time the concept participates in the satisfactory solution of some 
cognitive problem. Conversely, the cumulative quality rate is decreased if the solution is 
found to be unsatisfactory. 
If the aggregate of quality rate stabilises below a certain limit, the concept will be removed. 
The general approach here is named pragmatic reduction and is modelled by 
(6) prag
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where identprag
p
P
c
c
_  (Pprag_ident  0 Pprag_ident 1) represents the probability of identifying 
one parasitic concept by sampling during one time step and freqpragR _  (Rprag_freq ) represents 
the frequency by which this identification process occurs during one time step t. Both as 
constant assumed system parameters are combined to an abstract reduction parameter pragR  
which determines the performance of pragmatic reduction. Hereafter, pragR will be considered 
as independent of c. 
The second method proposes a clean-up by competition. If there are present parasitic 
concepts, it is likely that contains logical inconsistencies, since it is costly to check each 
concept at creation time for logical consistency against all concepts established in  [11]. 
Such inconsistencies will result in contradictory inferences about one and the same cognitive 
subject-matter [12]. Concepts which model reality well cause different inferences resulting 
consistently because – as a basic assumption in scientific theory – reality is assumed to be 
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consistent with itself [2]. Thus, only any remaining concepts of low quality can be responsible 
for contradictions.  
The clean-up method is supposed to locate contradictive concepts somehow and to identify 
the lower quality concepts by a success rate of statistic significance. This is similar to 
Darwinian selection as some survival-of-the-fittest method is used to decide about which of 
the contradictive concepts has to be removed from . The general approach here is named 
competing reduction and is defined by 
(7) comp
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where matchcomp
pp
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  (Pcomp_match  0 Pcomp_match 1) represents the probability of one 
parasitic concept matching one contradictive accurate concept per time step t. identcompP _  
(Pcomp_ident  0 Pcomp_ident 1) represents the probability of the successful identification of such 
a parasitic concept during t and freqcompR _  (Rcomp_freq ) represents the frequency by which 
such identification process occurs during t. All different probabilities are assumed to be 
independent from each other. The three as constant assumed system parameters are combined 
to one abstract reduction parameter compR  which determines the performance of competing 
reduction. Hereafter, compR will be considered as independent of c. 
Finally, the independent contributions to parasitic reduction for each time step by (6) and (7) 
lead to 
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accomplishing the definition of all parameters contained within equation (5).  
Different solutions for the evolution of parasitic contamination resulting from (5) for 
different system parameters are presented in figure 2 together with the results of a Monte 
Carlo simulation modelling the same scenario [13], but without using equation (5). The 
simulation was contributed in order to check if the probabilistic theory is correct. The results 
proved to be consistent as shown in figure 2. 
The Monte Carlo simulation uses a B which is not constant for each concept but is, more 
realistically, chosen randomly with binominal distribution. As shown in figure 2, assuming 
the mean value of the binominal distribution B  for solving (5) approximates fairly well the 
results of the Monte Carlo simulation within a certain range of c. 
Now, we are able to answer the question, whether and if yes at what contamination 
c
c p
 the 
intelligent agent will stabilise depending on different sets of the constant parameters {Perr, B, 
Rprag, Rcomp} for an ever-increasing c. Or, in other words, now we are able to calculate, what 
efforts of parasitic reduction are expected by our probabilistic model to preserve the concept 
space from becoming entirely contaminated by parasitic concepts. 
Defining the contamination parameter 
c
c
k
p
 and cc   it can be proven [14] that  
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exists as condition for a growing contamination and  
(10) 0)1)(1(1)2()1(
32  Berrcompcomppragcompprag kPkRkRRkRR  
for a decreasing or constant contamination assuming an ever-increasing c.  
It can be easily verified that (9) is given for k=0 and Perr>0. This means that even 
contamination free concept spaces will start to become contaminated with a growing .  
As soon as the growing contamination k causes (10) to be fulfilled, the contamination 
stabilises at this k. Thus, the boundary contamination which is approached by the intelligent 
agent for an ever-growing  is determined by searching for the zero in (10) by starting at 0-
contamination. 
Conversely, setting a maximum contamination k at slightly below 1 and tracing down (10) 
until the first zero is encountered, will identify the k at which the intelligent agent will 
stabilise for an ever growing after descending from a maximum contamination. If the initial 
contamination is total, i.e. equal to 1, the intelligent agent will remain stable at this 
contamination for an ever-growing .  
Figure 3 shows the final parasitic contamination for an infinitely growing as function of 
pragmatic and competing reduction for different sets of {Perr, B}. For each configuration one 
scenario starts at an initial contamination of 0 and the other at nearly 1.  
Interpretation and Conclusion 
Figure 3 shows a function type which for its characteristic shape here is named plateau 
function. Reducing the efforts for pragmatic and competing reduction sufficiently causes final 
parasitic contamination to approach towards a maximum of 1 which is on top of the plateau. 
Intelligent agents residing in such state will suffer from an ever decreasing quality within their 
knowledge space and therefore will be increasingly less able to make satisfying predictions 
about their environment. 
The effect of pragmatic and competing reduction effort is asymmetric: If the effort for 
pragmatic reduction is critically low, not any level of competing reduction is able to improve 
knowledge space’s quality evolution. In contrary, a sufficiently high pragmatic reduction 
effort is able to improve knowledge space’s quality evolution even without any competing 
reduction effort.  
As the threshold-like cliff edge of the plateau shows, there exists an area where increasing 
pragmatic or competing reduction effort only slightly will lead to a tremendous improvement 
of the knowledge space’s quality evolution. Contrariwise, a slight decrease of either reduction 
will cause knowledge quality collapsing. 
Interestingly, neither the amount of base concepts B nor the error probability Perr significantly 
determine the quality evolution of the knowledge space. Instead, the quality evolution is 
mainly determined by the pragmatic and competing reduction efforts. 
Outlook 
The mechanisms of concept space contamination mitigated by pragmatic and competing 
reduction seem to not be limited to the discipline of machine learning. Instead, they might be 
suspected to also play a role for learning in biological organisms and in human organisations. 
Further research might show whether there is any universality about this theory. 
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Figures
Fig. 1: parasitic propagation within a concept tree.  
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Fig. 2: Solution of equation (5) (black). The y-
axis is normalized to total number of concepts. 
The x-axis is normalized to initial number of 
concepts. The asymptote is determined by 
equation (10) (blue). The Monte Carlo 
simulation results max. (red) and min. (green) 
from 20 simulation epochs. The initial number 
of concepts is c0=1000 and of parasitic 
concepts cp0: 
(A) Perr=0.05, Bmin=2, Bmax=20, Rprag=0, Rcomp=0, cp0=10 
(B) Perr=0.1, Bmin=7, Bmax=7, Rprag=2, Rcomp=2, cp0=200 
(C) Perr=0.1, Bmin=2, Bmax=12, Rprag=2, Rcomp=2, cp0=200 
(D) Perr=0.1, Bmin=5, Bmax=5, Rprag=2, Rcomp=2, cp0=200 
(E) Perr=0.1, Bmin=2, Bmax=8, Rprag=2, Rcomp=2, cp0=200 
A 
B C 
D E 
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Perr=0.1, B=5, 0.99<k0<1 Perr=0.1, B=50, 0.99<k0<1 Perr=0.9, B=50, 0.99<k0<1 
Perr=0.1, B=5, k0=0 Perr=0.1, B=50, k0=0 Perr=0.9, B=50, k0=0 
Fig. 3: Final parasitic contamination resulting from equation (10) with k0 as initial parasitic contamination. 
